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Abstract. We present a framework for extending the functionality of
LDAP servers from their typical use as a public directory in public key
infrastructures. In this framework the LDAP servers are used for ad-
ministrating infrastructure processes. One application of this framework
is a method for providing proof-of-possession, especially in the case of
encryption keys. Another one is the secure delivery of software personal
security environments.
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1 Introduction
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides practical use of public key cryptog-
raphy proposed by Diffie and Hellmann [DH76]. Entities register for the services
of the PKI in order for them to achieve security goals like authenticity and
confidentiality using digital signatures and encryption. One of the most typical
products of a PKI are digital certificates. They bind a public key to an entity
which owns3 the corresponding private key. Commonly met certificates follow
the X.509 [X.509] and the RFC 3280 [HPFS02] standards. A PKI is usually
composed of two components namely the Registration Authority (RA) and the
Certification Authority (CA).
The task of the RA is to register an end-entity in the PKI by examining
its credentials. This entity may either already possess a key pair or not. In the
first case, the public key is provided by the entity to the RA during registration
and forwarded to the CA that issues the certificate. In the second case, the key
pair is produced by the CA and, together with the issued certificate, delivered
to the entity. In either case, the CA has to guarantee that finally the certificate
is issued for the entity that owns the corresponding private key.
3 An entity is considered to be the owner of a private key if and only if it can legally
use it.
The problem that arises in the first case is for the CA to determine whether
this entity does really own the corresponding private key or not. Therefore, the
entity must provide a Proof-of-Possession (PoP) for this private key. In several
certification request syntaxes special fields are reserved for this purpose. An im-
portant issue with PoP is the number of messages needed for accomplishing it.
While for signature keys the straightforward solution is to provide a signature
during registration, the situation is not so easy for encryption keys. One good
solution in terms of number of messages is the indirect scheme where the is-
sued certificate is encrypted with the included public key and thus can only
be read by the intended recipient. We provide an easy and efficient variant of
this scheme using a directory based on the lightweight directory access protocol
(LDAP) [HM02]. Furthermore, it can be extended to tightly link the PoP to the
registration procedure. Moreover, a successful PoP is necessary for activation
of the certificate. Whether or when this activation will take place is under full
control of the entity.
In the second case, the problem is to securely deliver the private key to the
registered and identified entity. A commonly used standard for software per-
sonal security environments (PSE) is PKCS#12 [PKCS12]. Usually, such PSEs
are either handed out face to face or sent by e-mail. For automated certification
processes in which management should be simple, the solution of physical pres-
ence can not be used since it hampers the automated process and requires human
administration. Sending the PKCS#12 file by e-mail is secure since PKCS#12
has mechanisms to ensure privacy and integrity. Nevertheless, the e-mail may
be intercepted by a third party which can try to extract the keys (in a password
protected PKCS#12 file this may be easy for a weak password). Moreover, the
e-mail may never reach his recipient due to an incorrectly configured spam filter
or even a mailbox which has reach its capacity limit. We suggest a scheme based
on an LDAP directory to ensure that only the legitimate recipient will receive
his PSE without any eavesdropping from a third party.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss specifications on
certification request messages and examine their proposals for achieving PoP. In
Section 3, we describe our proposed schemes and argue on their usability. Lastly,
in Section 4 we conclude the paper and discuss future work in this direction.
2 Certification Request Messages and PoP
Common practice for the registration of end-entities in a PKI environment are
special certification request message syntaxes. Several specifications address this
problem.
The most commonly used one is the PKCS#10 [PKCS10]. It defines a syntax
in which entities can provide information needed for creating a certificate from
the CA. Furthermore, it enables them to include other data that can be used
during and after the certification process. This syntax requires the message to be
secured with a digital signature. Among other purposes, this is done to provide
a PoP for the corresponding private key, since the signature can be verified from
the receiving party (RA or CA). However, this syntax does not consider keys
used for encryption only. Such keys might have to be treated differently due to
limitations of the cryptosystem or different security requirements.
Another specification is the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
[MASK99]. While handling signature keys identically to PKCS#10, it provides
three methods for PoP of encryption keys. The first is to reveal the private key
to the CA. The second one, called direct method, requires exchange of challenge-
response messages and thus needs extra messages. The third one, the indirect
method, is to encrypt the issued certificate with the contained public key and
have the end-entity to send the decrypted certificate back in a confirmation
message and by this demonstrate ownership of the corresponding private key.
Similar proposals can be found in Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
[AF99]. Special care about encryption keys is taken also in Certificate Manage-
ment Messages over CMS (CMC) [MLSW00]. CMC specifies a mechanism for
PoP which requires more than a single-round trip4 and therefore complicates
the process. Lastly, XKMS [XKMS] considers the PoP problem exclusively for
signature keys. For a discussion on PoP see also [ANL03].
The above proposals do not provide satisfactory solutions in cases where the
end-entity does not want to reveal its key or the certification process management
should be kept minimal and simple.
We believe that PoP is of great importance in the case of encryption keys.
A certificate containing a public key for which the corresponding private key
is not owned by the intended end-entity or does not exist at all is actually
unusable. Any message encrypted with this public key can not be decrypted by
the end-entity. This scenario can become extremely dangerous in cases where the
original message is destroyed5 and only the encrypted message exists. Therefore,
no one should be able to use a certificate containing encryption keys without
prior acknowledgement of its owner.
To solve the PoP problem we propose a scheme similar to the indirect method
described above, in which an end-entity is an authenticated user of an LDAP
directory, which he can download and activate his certificate from. But in order
to do so, he must decrypt a secret (implicit use of his private key), decrypt the
certificate and then put it back on the LDAP server. Thus, we can avoid extra
confirmation messages to the CA.
3 The New Schemes
3.1 LDAP basics
LDAP is a protocol for providing access to directories based on the X.500 spec-
ification [X.500]. The current version is LDAPv3 specified in [HM02]. Internet
4 A request which is done from the end-entity, processed from the CA and returned
to the end-entity.
5 This is a typical function of many encryption clients.
directories speaking LDAP are most commonly used in PKIs for dissemination
of public information. It is exactly this “public directory” mentioned in [DH76]
when public key cryptography was discovered. LDAP directories serve as the
place where clients can download certificates of other users in order to send en-
crypted messages or verify digital signatures. In addition they can be informed
with the latest certificate revocation information by downloading a certificate
revocation list (CRL) from the directory. Therefore, almost all PKIs support
LDAP and no significant rearrangements should be done from their side to use
an LDAP directory for managing processes in their environments.
Apart from the fact that LDAP is already supported by PKIs, it has also
attractive security features. It provides simple authentication of users with a
password6. In addition, it supports the simple authentication and security layer
(SASL) [Mey97] as illustrated in [WAHM00]. Lastly, it can be combined with
TLS [DA99] as described in [HMW00]. The communication over TLS guarantees
privacy and integrity of the data exchanged between an LDAP directory and a
client. The password authentication can be used in combination with TLS to
avoid that the password is transmitted in clear. For a thorough study on the
security of directories see [Cha00].
3.2 Providing PoP with LDAP
We present the scheme for providing PoP for encryption keys using an LDAP
directory.
In this scheme the CA is accepting a certification request for encryption
keys. At this point the CA assumes that the private key exists and issues the
certificate. After that, it creates an entry on the LDAP directory as usual. One
difference is that the certificate is encrypted with the public key it contains and
stored in the attribute encryptedUserCertificate (see Appendix A). Secondly, the
CA randomly chooses an LDAP user password. Its hashed value is placed in the
entry’s attribute userPassword for the simple authentication procedure of the
LDAP. It also encrypts the password using the entity’s public key and puts it in
the special attribute encryptedUserPassword. At this point even the user itself
does not know his password, since only its hash value and an encrypted version
is found on the directory.
We have introduced a new object class called pkiUserManagement (see Ap-
pendix A) which can hold the above described attributes. Figure 1 shows an
example of such an LDAP entry along with its attributes.
The end-entity, that owns the corresponding private key, does the following:
First, it downloads the encrypted password and certificate and decrypts them
with its private key. Now it can use the password to bind to the directory as an
authenticated user and write the decrypted certificate in its entry. With this the
PoP is completed and, simultaneously, the certificate is activated enabling other
entities to use it. On the contrary, for an end-entity that does not own the private
6 When used alone it does not really provide significant security since the password
travels in clear.
dc=myOrg,dc=com
C=DE C=FRC=GB
o=myOrg
ou=Unit
cn=ALice
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: pkiUserManagement
userCertificate: MII….X=
encryptedUserPassword:Pa5...Hw=
encryptedUserCertificate: CUtrG...ybd
userPassword: c29…..M=
sn=Alice Last Name
cn=Alice
Fig. 1. End-user entry in an LDAP server.
key, both the certificate and the password will remain encrypted in the directory
and cannot be used. Clearly, the communication between the authenticated user
and the LDAP server must be secured with SASL or TLS to avoid transmitting
the password in clear.
One step that the CA must perform is to force the LDAP directory, by proper
access control lists (ACLs), to accept write requests only for authenticated users
and only for the userCertificate attribute of their own entry. This enforces that
exclusively authenticated users can place their certificate only on their own entry
in the directory. In addition, these ACLs must be configured in such a way that
the user password (although hashed) is not visible to other users. This will
eliminate the possibility of dictionary attacks on the password performed from
any end-user.
An optional variant of this scheme, which can link both identity and PoP
information more tightly together, is the following: The encrypted password
(when decrypted) is only the half of the real password7 used by the user to
authenticate to the LDAP directory. The other half of the password is provided
to the user during registration. This half works as a shared-secret between the
CA and the end-user. The user, in order to authenticate to the directory, has to
combine the two passwords.
A third variant is to have the shared-secret function as the (complete) pass-
word for the user to authenticate to the directory. PoP will follow with decryption
7 Which is found hashed to the directory.
CRMF CMP CMC Proposed Solution
EKS + + + +
DM + + - -
PKR - - + +
SRT - - - +
Table 1. Comparison Table.
of the certificate without having to decrypt the password too. Nevertheless, in
this case the ability to authenticate to the directory is disconnected from PoP.
CAs can realise this scheme differently based on their policies. For example,
if after three days the certificate is still encrypted in the directory, the user is
deleted from the directory leaving him no ability to use this certificate. Alter-
natively, after decryption of the certificate the user password is deleted in order
for the user to be unable to authenticate to the directory.
3.3 Methods overview
We discuss the characteristics and properties of the certification request mes-
sages presented in Section 2 and our proposed LDAP based solution. PKCS#10
and XKMS do not support PoP for encryption keys (Encryption Key Support,
EKS) and we will not discuss them further in this section. CMC and the LDAP
based proposal specify only one possible method to provide PoP, while CRMF
and CMP offer three different ones (Different Methods, DM). Nevertheless, the
last ones propose revealing the private key (Private Key Revealing, PKR) as
a solution. Furthermore, CMC requires more than a single-round trip where all
other methods do not. But CMP and CRMF require that a confirmation message
should be sent to the CA. Our proposed method does not require those (Single
Round Trip, SRT). In table 1 we can see an overview of these characteristics.
3.4 Secure delivery of software PSEs with LDAP
A variation of the above scheme can be used for delivering software PSEs (usually
in the PKCS#12 format). In this scenario the PKCS#12 structure is placed in
the userPKCS12 [Smi00] attribute of the LDAP entry. The connections done
to the directory must be secured with TLS. If a user can authenticate to the
directory, then he has the ability to download its own PSE. But in order to
authenticate, he needs a password provided during registration. Therefore only
the intended user can access his PSE.
To enforce this, the CA has to choose special ACLs. Only the authenticated
users must have read access to the userPKCS12 attribute of their own entry,
while all others should have no privileges at all. Downloading the PSE is per-
formed with integrity and confidentiality due to the TLS connection.
We have implemented both schemes to provide a proof of concept. We have
used the OpenLDAP [OpenLDAP] directory since it gives the possibility to
create flexible ACLs and supports TLS and SASL. We have used JNDI [JNDI]
at the CA and client side for the LDAP interfaces.
3.5 Usability issues
We believe that these two basic applications for user management with LDAP
enhances the usability of the PKI. In the PoP case it is easier for a human user to
decrypt a value than to provide his private key or to engage himself in challenge-
response procedures. Decrypting data like the certificate or the password is the
intended usage of the decryption key and is already implemented in common
client software. Furthermore, most client software comes with LDAP support to
be able to fetch the certificates of others. These features can be easily extended
and combined to automatically fetch the encrypted data from the directory,
decrypt it and store the certificate back. Particularly, the last action can be
totally transparent to the end-entity.
Also, fetching a PSE from the directory is essentially the same as looking up
certificates of others. Thus, no extra development needs to be done for the client
software. The usability is increased by the fact, that the client can transparently
download the PKCS#12 file and integrate the contained private key at the client
side8. Instead, if the user has received his PSE by e-mail or floppy disc, he would
have to install it somehow manually. Furthermore, only the LDAP connection
has to be configured at the client and nothing else. Depending on the CA’s policy,
also the following strategy may be chosen: The software PSE may additionally
remain on the directory to serve as backup. Moreover, it can be available from
everywhere. For this, client software could be configured to download and use
the PSE on demand without mandatory storing it locally.
4 Conclusion
We have presented two schemes for providing proof-of-possession and secure de-
livery of personal security environments. Both schemes use an LDAP directory
which is already integrated in most PKIs, it is ideal for user management, it has
sufficient security features and many existent clients have already LDAP inter-
faces which can be extended. We plan to integrate our proposed solutions into
an upcoming PKI installation at the University of Darmstadt. Future work will
concentrate on extending the use of LDAP in PKIs for other administration and
certificate management tasks like certificate revocation and certificate renewal.
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Appendix A
Object Classes
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.2.2.1.6 NAME ’pkiUserManagement’ SUP top
AUXILIARY MAY ( userEncryptedPassword $ userEncryptedCertificate ) )
Attributes
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.2.2.1.7 NAME ’userEncryptedPassword’
EQUALITY octetStringMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 SINGLE-VALUE )
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.2.2.1.8 NAME ’userEncryptedCertificate’
EQUALITY octetStringMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 SINGLE-VALUE )
